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We introduce a simple protocol for verifiable measurement-only blind quantum computing. Alice,
a client, can perform only single-qubit measurements, whereas Bob, a server, can generate and store
entangled many-qubit states. Bob generates copies of a graph state, which is a universal resource
state for measurement-based quantum computing, and sends Alice each qubit of them one by one.
Alice adaptively measures each qubit according to her program. If Bob is honest, he generates the
correct graph state, and therefore Alice can obtain the correct computation result. Regarding the
security, whatever Bob does, Bob cannot learn any information about Alice’s computation because
of the no-signaling principle. Furthermore, malicious Bob does not necessarily send the copies of
the correct graph state, but Alice can check the correctness of Bob’s state by directly verifying
stabilizers of some copies.
Blind quantum computing is a quantum cryptographic
protocol that enables Alice (a client), who does not have
any sophisticated quantum technology, to delegate her
quantum computing to Bob (a server), who has a suf-
ficiently powerful quantum computer, without leaking
any her privacy. The first protocol of blind quantum
computing that uses the measurement-based quantum
computing [1] was proposed by Broadbent, Fitzsimons,
and Kashefi [2], and a proof-of-principle experiment was
demonstrated with photonic qubits [3]. In the protocol of
Ref. [2], Alice generates many randomly-rotated single-
qubit states, and sends them to Bob. Bob generates a
universal resource state of the measurement-based quan-
tum computing by applying entangling gates on qubits
sent from Alice. Then, they do two-way classical com-
munications: Alice instructs Bob how to measure each
qubit, and Bob returns measurement results so that Al-
ice can perform the feed-forward calculations. It was
shown in Ref. [2] that if Bob is honest, Alice can obtain
the correct quantum computing result (which we call the
correctness), and that whatever evil Bob does, he cannot
learn anything about Alice’s input, output, and program
(which we call the blindness) [4]. (See also Ref. [5] for
a precise proof of the security.) Inspired by the seminal
result, plenty of improvements have been done [6–20].
For example, it was shown that instead of single-qubit
states generation, single-qubit measurements [6] or co-
herent states generation [7] are sufficient for Alice. In
the protocol of Ref. [6], so called the measurement-only
blind quantum computing, Bob generates a universal re-
source state of measurement-based quantum computing
(Fig 1(a)), and sends each qubit of the resource state one
by one to Alice (Fig. 1(b)). Alice adaptively measures
each qubit according to her program (Fig. 1(b)). Since
adaptive single-qubit measurements on certain states are
universal [1, 21–23], Alice with only single-qubit measure-
ments ability can perform universal quantum computing
if Bob prepares the correct resource state. Furthermore,
since this protocol is a one-way quantum communication
from Bob to Alice, the blindness is guaranteed by the no-
signaling principle [6]. Here, the no-signaling principle
is one of the most fundamental assumptions in physics,
which says that if Alice and Bob share a system she can-
not transmit any her message to Bob whatever they do on
their systems. Quantum physics respects the no-signaling
principle.
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FIG. 1: The measurement-only blind quantum computing.
(a) Bob generates a resource state. (b) Bob sends Alice each
qubit of the resource state one by one. Alice adaptively mea-
sures each qubit.
In addition to the correctness and the blindness, the
verifiability is another important requirement for blind
quantum computing. The verifiability means that Al-
ice can check the correctness of Bob’s computation. Al-
though the blindness guarantees that Alice’s privacy is
kept secret against malicious Bob, it does not guaran-
tee the correctness of the computation result with ma-
licious Bob: Bob cannot learn Alice’s secret, but he
can mess up the computation. In order to avoid being
palmed off a wrong result, Alice needs some statistical
test to verify the correctness of Bob’s computing. There
are several protocols that enable verifiable blind quan-
tum computing [8–11, 24, 25]. Some of them [9, 24, 25]
elegantly achieve the completely classical client, but a
trade-off is the requirement of more than two servers
who do not communicate with each other. Although
pursuing the completely classical client is an important
direction, in particular, for the goal of constructing an
interactive proof of BQP, where the assumption of non-
communicating multi provers is natural, in this paper
we restrict ourselves to the single-server setup assum-
ing some minimum quantum technologies for the client,
since in the context of blind quantum computing, as-
2suming some minimum quantum technologies for the
client is more realistic than to assume that the client
can verify that remote servers are not communicating
with each other. These results also achieve the device
independence. Although our protocol assumes the cor-
rectness of measurement devices, it enables to derive a
more practical bound suitable for experiments. Proto-
cols in Refs. [8, 10, 11] need only a single server by as-
suming some minimum quantum technologies, which are
available in today’s laboratories, for the client. (The pro-
tocol of Ref. [10] requires single-qubit states generations,
and those of Refs. [8, 11] require single-qubit measure-
ments for the client.) The idea of the verification in the
protocols of Refs. [8–11] is to use trap qubits: Alice se-
cretly hides trap qubits in the resource state, and any dis-
turbance of a trap signals Bob’s dishonesty [8–11]. An
experimental demonstration of the idea was done with
photonic qubits [26].
In this paper, we propose another protocol for verifi-
able measurement-only blind quantum computing. The
blindness is again guaranteed by the no-signaling princi-
ple like Ref. [6]. The verifiability is, on the other hand,
achieved in a more straightforward way: instead of hid-
ing traps, Alice directly checks whether the state sent
from Bob is correct or not by testing stabilizers [27].
Alice asks Bob to generate 2k + 1 copies |G〉⊗2k+1 of
the graph state |G〉, where |G〉 is an n-qubit graph state
and k = poly(n). The graph state |G〉 is defined by
|G〉 ≡
(⊗
e∈E CZe
)
|+〉⊗n, where |+〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), E
is the set of edges of G, and CZe is the Controlled-Z gate,
CZ ≡ |0〉〈0|⊗I+ |1〉〈1|⊗Z, acting on the pair of vertices
sharing the edge e. The graph state |G〉 has the stabiliz-
ers Xj
⊗
i∈N(j) Zi, for j = 1, 2, ..., n, where N(j) is the
set of the vertices connected to j. Alice uses randomly
chosen 2k copies of |G〉⊗2k+1 to check stabilizers, and the
rest of it for her computation. If Bob is honest, he gen-
erates |G〉⊗2k+1, and in this case we will show that she
passes the test with probability 1. If Bob is evil, on the
other hand, he might generate another n(2k + 1)-qubit
state. However, we will show that if she passes the test,
the closeness of the single copy to the correct graph state
|G〉 is guaranteed with a sufficiently small significance
level. Any graph state can be used for our protocol as
long as the corresponding graph G is bipartite. There-
fore, for example, Alice can perform the fault-tolerant
topological measurement-based quantum computing [21]
by taking |G〉 as the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal lat-
tice [21] (Fig. 2(a)).
Note that there are several proposals for testing quan-
tum gate operations [30, 31], but testing quantum circuit
models assumes the identical and independent properties
of each gate, and suffers from the scalability and complex-
ity of the analysis. On the other hand, our result in the
present paper (and Ref. [25]) demonstrate that testing
quantum computing becomes much easier if we consider
a measurement-based quantum computing model, which
is a new interesting advantage of the measurement-based
quantum computing model over the circuit model. For
more details about the relations between our result and
previous works, see Appendix.
Protocol.— Our protocol runs as follows:
1. Honest Bob generates |G〉⊗2k+1, where |G〉 is an
n-qubit graph state on a bipartite graph G, whose
vertices are divided into two disjoint sets W and
B. (Fig. 2(a) and (b).) Bob sends each qubit of
it one by one to Alice. Evil Bob can generate any
n(2k + 1)-qubit state ρ instead of |G〉⊗2k+1.
2. Alice divides 2k + 1 blocks of n qubits into three
groups by random choice. (Fig. 2(c).) The first
group consists of k blocks of n qubits. The second
group consists of k blocks of n qubits. The third
group consists of a single block of n qubits.
3. Alice uses the third group for her computation.
Other blocks are used for the test, which will be
explained later. (Fig. 2(c).)
4. If Alice passes the test, she accepts the result of the
computation performed on the third group.
ρ
computationtest test
(a)
(c)
1st group 2nd group 3nd group
(b)
FIG. 2: (a) The RHG lattice. (b) An example of bipartite
graphs: the two-dimensional square lattice. Black and white
colors indicate the bipartitions B and W , respectively. (c) An
example for n = 3, k = 2. Two blocks go to the first group
and the other two blocks go to the second group. The left
block goes to the third group.
For each block of the first and second groups, Alice
performs the following test:
1. For each block of the first group, Alice measures
qubits of W in the Z basis and qubits of B in the
X basis. (Fig. 3(a).)
2. For each block of the second group, Alice measures
qubits of B in the Z basis and qubits of W in the
X basis. (Fig. 3(b).)
3. If the measurement outcomes in the X basis coin-
cide with the values predicted from the outcomes
in the Z basis (in terms of the stabilizer relations),
3then the test is passed. If any outcome in the X ba-
sis that violates the stabilizer relations is obtained,
Alice rejects.
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FIG. 3: An example for the two-dimensional square lattice.
The measurement pattern for the first group (a) and the sec-
ond group (b).
Analysis.— Let us analyze the correctness, blindness,
and verifiability of our protocol. First, our protocol is a
one-way quantum communication from Bob to Alice, and
therefore, the blindness is guaranteed by the no-signaling
principle as in the protocol of Ref. [6]. Second, it is ob-
vious that if ρ = |G〉〈G|⊗2k+1 , then Alice passes the test
with probability 1. Therefore, if Bob is honest, Alice
passes the test with probability 1 and she obtains the
correct computation result on the third group. Hence
the correctness is satisfied. Finally, to study the verifia-
bility, we consider the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Assume that α > 12k+1 . If the test is passed,
with significance level α, we can guarantee that the resul-
tant state σ of the third group satisfies
〈G|σ|G〉 ≥ 1−
1
α(2k + 1)
. (1)
(Note that the significance level is the maximum passing
probability when malicious Bob sends incorrect states so
that the resultant state σ does not satisfy (1) [28].) The
proof of the theorem is given below and in Appendix.
From the theorem and the relation between the fidelity
and trace norm [32, (6.106)], we can conclude the verifi-
ability: If Alice passes the test, she can guarantee
∣∣∣Tr(Cσ) − Tr(C|G〉〈G|)
∣∣∣ ≤ 1√
α(2k + 1)
for any POVM C with the significance level α. If we
take α = 1√
2k+1
, for example, the left-hand side of the
above inequality is 1
(2k+1)1/4
→ 0 if k →∞, and therefore
the verifiability is satisfied. Note that the lower bound,
α > 12k+1 , of the significance level α is tight, since if Bob
generates 2k copies of the correct state |G〉 and a single
copy of a wrong state, Bob can fool Alice with probability
1
2k+1 , which corresponds to α =
1
2k+1 .
Proof of Theorem.— The proof of the theorem is based
on several interesting insights:
1. By considering an appropriate subspace, we can
reduce the problem to the test of a maximally-
entangled state.
2. For the test of a maximally-entangled state, veri-
fications of coincidences of X measurement results
with Z measurement results are sufficient. Further-
more, since we are interested in the fidelity between
the given state and a maximally-entangled state,
we can consider, without loss of generality, the dis-
cretely twirled version of the given state, which
drastically simplifies the problem [29].
3. Finally, since we check the coincidence or discrep-
ancy of the measurement results between two par-
ties of the given bipartite cut, we have only to con-
sider a distribution on (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1)
for each block, and therefore we can reduce the
problem to a classical hypothesis testing.
Let us explain the first point. Employing suitable
classical data conversions, we can assume the following.
The systems HB and HW are written as KB ⊗ K
′
B and
KW ⊗K
′
W by using an n
′
B-qubit system KB and an n
′
W -
qubit system KW , respectively. We denote the eigenstate
corresponding to the eigenvalue all 0 of X ’s in K′B by
|+〉B′ , which is the graph state with isolated sites with
no edge. Similarly, we define |+〉W ′ . So, we find that
the systems KB and KW are the same dimension, i.e.,
n′B = n
′
W . Let |G
′〉 be the graph state on KB ⊗ KW
whose graph is composed of isolated edges. The true
state is given as the state |G′〉 ⊗ |+〉B′ ⊗ |+〉W ′ . In this
way, we can reduce the problem to that of the maximally-
entangled state. Note that Alice’s measurements on HB
and HW are replaced by on KB and KW , respectively.
Applying the original Alice’s measurement, Alice can re-
alize the above modified measurement. The detail of this
discussion is given in Appendix.
Now let us explain the second point. We focus on the
Hilbert space (KB ⊗KW )
⊗(2k+1). Since the three groups
are randomly chosen, the state ρ is permutation invari-
ant. Let us denote elements of F
n′B
2 by x = (x1, . . . , xn′B ),
etc. We define operators Xx ≡ Xx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ X
xn′
B ,
Z
z ≡ Zz1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Z
zn′
B , on (C2)⊗n
′
B , which satisfy
X
x
B ⊗ Z
−x
W |G
′〉 = |G′〉, XxW ⊗ Z
−x
B |G
′〉 = |G′〉. (2)
In the following, we regard XxB, Z
z
B as operators on KB
and XxW , Z
z
W as operators on KW . Here, we distinguish
x and −x so that we can easily extend our analysis to
the qudit case.
Furthermore, for x = (x1, . . . , x2k+1) ∈ (F
n′B
2 )
2k+1 and
z = (z1, . . . , z2k+1) ∈ (F
n′B
2 )
2k+1, using the operator
W
x,z
B ≡ X
x
BZ
z
B on KB, we define W
x,z
B ≡ W
x1,z1
B ⊗ · · · ⊗
W
x2k+1,z2k+1
B on K
⊗2k+1
B . Also, we define W
x,z
W on KW ,
and Wx,zW on K
⊗2k+1
W , in the same way. Eq. (2) implies
that Wx,zB ⊗W
−z,−x
W |G
′〉⊗2k+1 = |G′〉⊗2k+1. Hence,
Tr
[
(Wx,zB ⊗W
−z,−x
W )
†ρ(Wx,zB ⊗W
−z,−x
W )|G
′〉〈G′|⊗2k+1
]
= Tr
(
ρ|G′〉〈G′|⊗2k+1
)
.
4Thus, the discrete-twirled state
ρ ≡
∑
x,z
2−2n
′
B(2k+1)(Wx,zB ⊗W
−z,−x
W )
†ρ(Wx,zB ⊗W
−z,−x
W )
satisfies Tr (ρ|G′〉〈G′|⊗2k+1) = Tr (ρ|G′〉〈G′|⊗2k+1) [29].
Also, we have
Tr 1
[
(Tr 2,3ρ)|G
′〉〈G′|⊗k
]
= Tr 1
[
(Tr 2,3ρ)|G
′〉〈G′|⊗k
]
,
Tr 2
[
(Tr 1,3ρ)|G
′〉〈G′|⊗k
]
= Tr 2
[
(Tr 1,3ρ)|G
′〉〈G′|⊗k
]
,
Tr 3
[
(Tr 1,2ρ)|G
′〉〈G′|
]
= Tr 3
[
(Tr 1,2ρ)|G
′〉〈G′|
]
.
Therefore, we have only to consider the discretely twirled
version of ρ. Note that the upper subscript of x and z
expresses the choice of group, and the lower subscript of
x and z expresses the site of the modified graph.
Finally, let us explain the third point. Since (Wx,zB ⊗
W
−z,−x
W )ρ(W
x,z
B ⊗ W
−z,−x
W )
† = ρ and ρ is permutation-
invariant, the state ρ is written with a permutation-
invariant distribution P on F
2n′B(2k+1)
2 as [29]
ρ =
∑
x,z
P (x, z)Wx,zB |G
′⊗2k+1〉〈G′⊗2k+1|(Wx,zB )
†.
Then, we define the function f from (F
n′B
2 )
2(2k+1) to
({0, 1}2)(2k+1) as f : (x, z) 7→ (s1, t1), . . . , (s2k+1, t2k+1),
where si :=
{
0 if xi = 0
1 if xi 6= 0
and ti :=
{
0 if zi = 0
1 if zi 6= 0.
Here, xi and zi are elements of F
n′B
2 . So, 0 in the above
conditions expresses the zero vector in F
n′B
2 although si
is an element of F2.
We introduce the distributions
Pˆ ((s1, t1), . . . , (s2k+1, t2k+1)) on ({0, 1}
2)(2k+1) as
Pˆ := P ◦ f−1.
Once, Bob’s operation is given, the values
s1, . . . , s2k+1, t1, . . . , t2k+1 are given as random variables
although half of s1, . . . , s2k, t1, . . . , t2k can be observed.
To employ the notations of probability theory, we
express them using the capital letters as S1, . . . , S2k+1,
T1, . . . , T2k+1. Hence, Pˆ (Si = 0) expresses the proba-
bility that the i-th measurement outcome of X basis
of B system coincides with the prediction by the i-th
measurement outcome of Z basis of W system. So, to
show Theorem 1, it is enough to show the following the-
orem. Similarly, Pˆ (Tk+i = 0) expresses the probability
that the k + i-th measurement outcome of X basis of
W system coincides with the prediction by the k + i-th
measurement outcome of Z basis of B system. So, to
show Theorem 1, it is enough to show the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 Assume that α > 12k+1 . When the distribu-
tion Pˆ satisfies
Pˆ (S2k+1 = T2k+1 = 0|Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
≥ 1−
1
α(2k + 1)
,
the probability Pˆ (Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) is upper
bounded by α.
In this way, we have reduced the problem to the classical
hypothesis testing. The proof of Theorem 2 is given in
Appendix.
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Appendix A: Relation to previous works
Here we discuss relations between our result and previ-
ous works. The hypothesis testing of an entangled state
by local measurements was initiated by the paper [33].
The paper [33] treats only the maximally entangled state.
The next paper [34] derived its asymptotic optimal per-
formance in the i.i.d. setting. Then, the papers [35–38]
extended these results to the case of a non-maximally en-
tangled state. However, these papers consider only the
locality condition between two parties. To apply the hy-
pothesis testing to the blind quantum computation based
on the measurement based quantum computation, we
need the following conditions.
(1) The test can be applied to the case of a graph state.
(2) Our quantum operations are restricted to single-
qubit measurements.
Since the previous studies [33–38] do not satisfy both
conditions, we cannot use them. The papers [39, 40] sat-
isfy these conditions as the verification of graph states,
but their results assume i.i.d. samples, which is somehow
reasonable in laboratory experiments, but cannot be ac-
cepted in quantum cryptography where a malicious ad-
versary can do anything. That is, we need the following
additional requirement.
(3) We cannot assume i.i.d. samples.
Therefore, these results cannot be directly used for the
verification in blind quantum computing. Our protocol
satisfies all of these conditions.
The verification in blind quantum computing was ini-
tiated in Ref. [10]. The idea of their protocol is to use
the trap technique: Alice secretly hides isolated qubits
5as traps, and if a trap is changed by Bob, she can de-
tect his malicious behavior. Several generalizations of
Ref. [10] have been obtained [11, 41, 42], but all of them
essentially use the same idea, namely, the trap technique.
Our protocol, on the other hand, uses a completely dif-
ferent technique for the verification, i.e., the direct graph
state testing, for the first time.
The graph state verification is also used in the context
of the multiprover interactive proof system. For exam-
ple, Ref. [25] gave an elegant protocol that uses a device-
independent graph state verification. However, the re-
sults in multiprover interactive proof system can neither
be directly used in blind quantum computing, since the
assumption that provers do not communicate with each
other is not natural in the blind quantum computing.
Appendix B: Analysis of local conversion for a
bipartite graph state
We show how the graph state |G〉 is converted to
|G′〉 ⊗ |+〉B′ ⊗ |+〉W ′ . For this purpose, we define the
notations more formally. When the true state is |G〉,
the outcome of measurement with X basis in the party
B takes values in the subspace over the finite filed F2.
We denote the subspace by VB , and denote its dimen-
sion by n′B. The orthogonal complement is denoted by
V ′B . Then, the space of the measurement outcome with
X basis in the party B is written as VB ⊕ V
′
B . So, we
denote the Hilbert space corresponding to VB and V
′
B by
KB and K
′
B, respectively. Then, we haveHB = KB⊗K
′
B.
We denote the eigenstate corresponding to the eigenvalue
all 0 of X ’s in K′B by |+〉B′ , which is the graph state with
isolated sites with no edge. Similarly, we define VW , V
′
W ,
KW , K
′
W , n
′
W and |+〉W ′ and have HW = KW ⊗ K
′
W
and n′W = n
′
B. Then, we define the graph state |G
′〉 on
KB ⊗KW whose graph is composed of isolated edges. In
the following, we show that the true state is given as the
state |G′〉 ⊗ |+〉B′ ⊗ |+〉W ′ .
For an invertible nB × nB matrix C, we define the
unitary operator UC,Z,B as
UC,Z,B :=
∑
z∈FnB2
|Cz〉B B〈z|.
Using the X basis states |x〉X,B , we define the unitary
operator UC,X,B as
UC,X,B :=
∑
x∈FnB2
|Cx〉X,B X,B〈x|.
Then, we have the relation
UC,X,B = U(C−1)T ,Z,B,
which can be shown as follows.
UC,X,B|z〉B
=
1
2nB/2
∑
x∈FnB2
|Cx〉X,B X,B〈x|
∑
x′∈FnB2
(−1)x
′·z|x〉B
=
1
2nB/2
∑
x∈FnB2
(−1)x·z|Cx〉X,B
=
1
2nB/2
∑
x′∈FnB2
(−1)C
−1x′·z|x′〉X,B = |(C−1)T z〉B.
Similarly, we can define UD,X,W and UD,X,W for an in-
vertible nW × nW matrix D.
Next, given the graph state |G〉, we define the nB×nW
matrix A = (ai.j) as follows. When the site j of W is
connected to the site i of B, ai,j is 1. Otherwise, ai,j is
zero. Then, we have
|G〉 =
1
2nW /2
∑
z∈FnW2
|Az〉X,B|z〉W .
Then, when we measure W with the Z basis and obtain
the outcome z, we obtain Az with the X measurement
on B. Then, we have
|G〉 =
1
2nB/2
∑
z∈FnB2
|z〉X,B|A
T z〉W
because any vector z′ ∈ FnB2 satisfies
B〈z
′|G〉
=
1
2nB/2
∑
x∈FnB2
X,B〈x|(−1)
x·z′ 1
2nW /2
∑
z∈FnW2
|Az〉X,B|z〉W
=
1
2nB/2
(−1)Az·z
′ 1
2nW /2
∑
z∈FnW2
|z〉W
=
1
2nB/2
|AT z′〉X,W .
Now, we choose a basis c1, . . . , cn′B of the n
′
B-
dimensional subspace VB that is composed of the possible
outcomes with X basis in B. Also, we choose nB − n
′
B
vectors cn′B+1, . . . , cnB of F
nB
2 such that c1, . . . , cnB form
a basis of FnB2 . We choose n
′
W vectors d1, . . . , dn′W of F
nW
2
such that ci = Adi, and choose a basis dn′W+1, . . . , dnW of
the kernel of A. Then, we define the invertible nB × nB
matrix C and the invertible nW × nW matrix D by
C = (c1 . . . cnB )
D = (d1 . . . dnW ).
So, we define the nB × nW matrix A
′ := C−1AD, which
is written as
A′ =
(
In′B 0
0 0
)
.
6So the state 1
2nW/2
∑
z∈FnW2 |A
′z〉X,B|z〉W corresponds to
the graph with many isolated edges and many isolated
sites. Hence, it can be regarded as the state |G′〉⊗|+〉B′⊗
|+〉W ′ .
Now, we have
1
2nW /2
∑
z∈FnW2
|A′z〉X,B|z〉W
=
1
2nW /2
∑
z∈FnW2
|C−1ADz〉X,B|z〉W
=
1
2nW /2
∑
z∈FnW2
|C−1Az〉X,B|D−1z〉W
=UC−1,X,BUD−1,Z,W
1
2nW /2
∑
z∈FnW2
|Az〉X,B|z〉W
=UC−1,X,BUD−1,Z,W |G〉
=UCT ,Z,BUDT ,X,W |G〉
=
1
2nB/2
∑
z∈FnB2
|z〉B|A
T z〉X,W
=
1
2nB/2
∑
z∈FnB2
|CT z〉B|D
TAT z〉X,W .
Hence, |G〉 can be converted to the state |G′〉 ⊗ |+〉B′ ⊗
|+〉W ′ via the local unitary UC−1,X,BUD−1,Z,W . When we
apply the Z measurement onW and the X measurement
on B, the application of the unitary UC−1,X,BUD−1,Z,W is
equivalent with the application of the classical conversion
x 7→ C−1x and z 7→ D−1z. Similarly, when we apply
the Z measurement on B and the X measurement on
W , the application of the unitary UC−1,X,BUD−1,Z,W is
equivalent with the application of the classical conversion
x 7→ DTx and z 7→ CT z. Hence, applying these classical
data conversions, we can treat the state |G〉 as the state
|G′〉 ⊗ |+〉B′ ⊗ |+〉W ′ .
Appendix C: Concrete examples
Here, for a better understanding, we demonstrate the
above results for few-qubit graph states.
1. Three-qubit graph state
Let us consider the case of the three-qubit graph state
on •−◦−•. We number the left black circle 1 and do the
right black circle 2. Then, the matrix A =
(
1
1
)
. Then,
c1 =
(
1
1
)
. Now, we have two choices for c2,
(
1
0
)
and
(
0
1
)
. Then, we choose c2 =
(
1
0
)
, which implies
that C =
(
1 1
1 0
)
and C−1 =
(
0 1
1 1
)
. Also, we have
D = 1. Therefore, the required classical data conversions
are given as follows. When we obtain X1 and X2 as the
X measurement on B, and Z1 the Z measurement on
W , we need to use the data X2, X1 +X2, Z1 instead of
the original data. That is, we check whether the relation
X2 = Z1 holds. When we obtain Z1 and Z2 as the Z
measurement on B, and X1 the X measurement on W ,
we need to use the data Z1 + Z2, Z1, X1 instead of the
original data. That is, we check whether the relation
X1 = Z1 + Z2 holds.
2. Four-qubit graph state
Next, we consider the four-qubit graph state on the
graph • − ◦ − • − ◦. We number the left black circle 1
and do the right black circle 2. Similarly, we number the
white circles. Then, the matrix A =
(
1 0
1 1
)
. Now, we
choose c1 =
(
1
1
)
and c2 =
(
0
1
)
, which implies that
C = A and C−1 =
(
1 0
1 1
)
. Also, we have D = D−1 =
I. Therefore, the required classical data conversions are
given as follows. When we obtain X1 and X2 as the X
measurement on B, and Z1 and Z2 the Z measurement
on W , we need to use the data X1+X2, X2, Z1, and Z2
instead of the original data. That is, we check whether
the relations X1 + X2 = Z1 and X2 = Z2 hold. When
we obtain Z1 and Z2 as the Z measurement on B, and
X1 and X2 the X measurement on W , we need to use
the data Z1, Z1 +Z2, X1, and X2 instead of the original
data. That is, we check whether the relations X1 = Z1
and X2 = Z1 + Z2 hold.
Appendix D: Analysis of the classical hypothesis
testing problem
In this appendix, we show
Lemma 1 When the distribution Pˆ satisfies
Pˆ (Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) ≥ α,
we have
Pˆ (S2k+1 = T2k+1 = 0|Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
≥ 1−
1
α(2k + 1)
.
Here, Pˆ is a distribution on 2k+1 trials, in which, each
trial consists of two bits. Also, it is invariant for permu-
tation of 2k + 1 trials.
Since Lemma 1 is the contraposition of Theorem 2 in the
body, it is sufficient to show Lemma 1.
7To address permutation-invariant distributions on 2k+
1 trials, we prepare the typical permutation-invariant dis-
tribution Pˆa,b,c, in which, the possible numbers of events
(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (1, 1) are fixed to 2k+1−(a+b+c),
a, b, and c, respectively. Hence, the real numbers a, b and
c satisfy that a, b, c ≥ 0 and 2k+1 ≥ a+ b+ c. Then, an
arbitrary permutation-invariant distribution Pˆ is written
as
Pˆ =
∑
a,b,c
Q(a, b, c)Pˆa,b,c, (D1)
where Q is a distribution on the set {(a, b, c)|a, b, c ≥
0, a + b + c ≤ 2k + 1}. In the following discussion, we
consider the properties of typical permutation-invariant
distributions Pˆa,b,c with the above condition for (a, b, c).
Consider the case when c ≥ 2. Since we detect ”1” at
least once among 2k outcomes S1, . . . , Sk, Tk+1, . . . , T2k,
we have
Pˆa,b,c(Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) = 0.
Consider the case when c = 1. When a ≥ k + 1, we
detect ”1” at least once among k outcomes Tk+1, . . . , T2k
of X basis. Hence, we have
Pˆa,b,1(Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) = 0. (D2)
When b ≥ k + 1, we can show (D2) in the same way.
Assume that a, b ≤ k. To realize Sj = Tk+j = 0 for
1 ≤ j ≤ k, the following conditions are required. a events
(1, 0) occur from k + 1-th trial to 2k-th trial. b events
(0, 1) occur from 1-th trial to k-th trial. One event (1, 1)
occurs in 2k+1-th trial. Hence, k− a events (0, 0) occur
from k+1-th trial to 2k-th trial. k− b events (0, 0) occur
from 1st trial to k-th trial. In this case, the number of
total cases is (2k+1)!(2k−a−b)!a!b! . The number of cases satisfying
the above conditions is k!(k−a)!a!
k!
(k−b)!b! . Hence, we have
Pˆa,b,1(Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
=
k!
(k−a)!a!
k!
(k−b)!b!
(2k+1)!
(2k−a−b)!a!b!
=
k!k!(2k − a− b)!
(2k + 1)!(k − a)!(k − b)!
=
1
2k + 1
·
k · · · (k − a+ 1) · k · · · (k − b+ 1)
(2k) · · · (2k + 1− a− b)
≤
1
2k + 1
. (D3)
When Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the event (1, 1)
occurs in 2k + 1-th trial, i.e., S2k+1 = T2k+1 = 1. Thus,
Pˆa,b,1(S2k+1 = T2k+1 = Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
=Pˆa,b,1(S2k+1 = T2k+1 = 0|Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
=0.
Consider the case when c = 0. When a ≥ k + 2 or
b ≥ k + 2, similar to (D2), we can show that
Pˆa,b,0(Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) = 0.
Assume that a, b ≤ k+1. The condition Sj = Tk+j = 0
for 1 ≤ j ≤ k holds when one of the following three sets
of conditions holds.
(1) b−1 events (0, 1) occur from 1st trial to k-th trial. a
events (1, 0) occur from k+1-th trial to 2k-th trial.
The event (0, 1) occurs in 2k + 1-th trial.
(2) b events (0, 1) occur from 1st trial to k-th trial. a−1
events (1, 0) occur from k+1-th trial to 2k-th trial.
The event (1, 0) occurs in 2k + 1-th trial.
(3) b events (0, 1) occur from 1st trial to k-th trial. a
events (1, 0) occur from k+1-th trial to 2k-th trial.
The event (0, 0) occurs in 2k + 1-th trial.
The numbers of cases of (1), (2), and (3) are
(
k
(b−1)
)(
k
a
)
,(
k
b
)(
k
(a−1)
)
, and
(
k
b
)(
k
a
)
, respectively. Since the number of
total cases is (2k+1)!(2k+1−a−b)!a!b! . Hence, we have
8Pˆa,b,0(Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) =
(
k
(b−1)
)(
k
a
)
+
(
k
b
)(
k
(a−1)
)
+
(
k
b
)(
k
a
)
(2k+1)!
(2k+1−a−b)!a!b!
=
(2k + 1− a− b)!a!b!
(2k + 1)!
(k!)2(
1
a!(b− 1)!(k − a)!(k − b+ 1)!
+
1
(a− 1)!b!(k − a+ 1)!(k − b)!
+
1
a!b!(k − a)!(k − b)!
)
=
(2k + 1− a− b)!a!b!
(2k + 1)!
(k!)2(
b(k − a+ 1)
a!b!(k − a+ 1)!(k − b+ 1)!
+
a(k − b+ 1)
a!b!(k − a+ 1)!(k − b+ 1)!
+
(k − a+ 1)(k − b+ 1)
a!b!(k − a+ 1)!(k − b+ 1)!
)
=
(2k + 1− a− b)!a!b!
(2k + 1)!
(k!)2
b(k − a+ 1) + a(k − b+ 1) + (k − a+ 1)(k − b+ 1)
a!b!(k − a+ 1)!(k − b+ 1)!
=
(2k + 1− a− b)!a!b!
(2k + 1)!
(k!)2
(k + 1)2 − ab
a!b!(k − a+ 1)!(k − b+ 1)!
=
(2k + 1− a− b)!a!b!
(2k + 1)!
((k + 1)!)2
(k + 1)2
(k + 1)2 − ab
a!b!(k − a+ 1)!(k − b+ 1)!
=
(k + 1)2 − ab
(k + 1)2
(k + 1) · · · (k + 2− a) · (k + 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
(2k + 1) · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
. (D4)
Here, one might consider that (k + 1)2 can be canceled
as a common factor. However, it is not true when a or
b is zero. To keep the validity even in this case, we need
to keep the term (k + 1)2 in the denominator.
Next, we proceed to Pˆa,b,0(S2k+1 = T2k+1 = 0, Sj =
Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k). The conditions S1 = . . . =
Sk = Tk+1 = . . . = T2k = 0 holds when the conditions
(3) holds. Hence, we have
Pˆa,b,0(S2k+1 = T2k+1 = Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
=
(
k
b
)(
k
a
)
(2k+1)!
(2k+1−a−b)!a!b!
=
(2k + 1− a− b)!a!b!
(2k + 1)!
(k!)2
a!b!(k − a)!(k − b)!
=
k!k!(2k + 1− a− b)!
(2k + 1)!(k − a)!(k − b)!
=
k · · · (k + 1− a) · k · · · (k + 1− b)
(2k + 1) · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
. (D5)
Thus,
Pˆa,b,0(S2k+1 = T2k+1 = 0|Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
=
(k + 1− a)(k + 1− b)
(k + 1)2 − ab
. (D6)
In the following, we discuss the distribution Q instead
of Pˆ because of (D1). Due to the above calculation, the
event Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k occurs only when
c = 0, 1. To evaluate the probability of this event, it is
sufficient to consider the case of c = 0, 1. That is, we
can restrict the support of the distribution Q to the case
of c = 0, 1. Hence, using a parameter β ∈ [0, 1] and a
distribution Q0 on the support {(a, b)|a+ b ≤ 2k+1, 0 ≤
a ≤ k + 1, 0 ≤ b ≤ k + 1} and a distribution Q1 on the
support {(a, b)|0 ≤ a ≤ k, 0 ≤ b ≤ k}, the distribution Q
is written as
Q(a, b, c) =


βQ0(a, b) if c = 0
(1− β)Q1(a, b) if c = 1
0 otherwise.
Define
T1[Q0] :=
∑
(a,b)
Q0(a, b)Pˆa,b,0(Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
T2[Q1] :=
∑
(a,b)
Q1(a, b)Pˆa,b,1(Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k),
and
T3[Q0]
:=
∑
(a,b)
Q0(a, b)Pˆa,b,0
(
S2k+1 = T2k+1 = Sj = Tk+j = 0
for 1 ≤ j ≤ k
)
.
Then, we can show the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Assume that
α >
1
2k + 1
. (D7)
When
βT1[Q0] + (1− β)T2[Q1] ≥α. (D8)
we have
βT3[Q0]
βT1[Q0] + (1 − β)T2[Q1]
≥ 1−
1
α(2k + 1)
.
Since Pˆ (Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) = βT1[Q0] +
(1 − β)T2[Q1] and Pˆ (S2k+1 = T2k+1 = 0|Sj = Tk+j =
90 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) = βT3[Q0]βT1[Q0]+(1−β)T2[Q1] , Lemma 2 yields
Lemma 1. Hence, it is sufficient to show Lemma 2.
The tightness of Lemma 2, i.e., that of Lemma 1, can
be shown as follows. Assume that α < 12k+1 , β = 0,
and Q1(a, b) = δa,0δb,0, which corresponds to the distri-
bution Pˆ satisfying the following. The event (1, 1) occurs
only in one event, and the remaining 2k events are (0, 0).
Then, Eq. (D8) holds nevertheless βT3[Q0]βT1[Q0]+(1−β)T2[Q1] =
0. That is, the distribution Pˆ breaks the condition
Pˆ (Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) ≤ α nevertheless
Pˆ (S2k+1 = T2k+1 = 0|Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) = 0.
Hence, the constraint α > 12k+1 is crucial. This situ-
ation corresponds to the following Bob’s strategy. Bob
generates 2k copies of the true state |G〉 and inserts only
one bad state Wx,zB |G〉, where x, z are non-zero elements.
Then, Bob can success the cheat with probability 12k+1 .
To show Lemma 2, we prepare the following lemma,
which will be shown in the next section.
Lemma 3 The relation
(k + 1− a)(k + 1− b)
(k + 1)2 − ab
≥1−
1
2k + 1
(k + 1)2
(k + 1)2 − ab
×
(2k + 1) · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k + 1) · · · (k + 2− a) · (k + 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
(D9)
holds for 2k + 1 ≥ a+ b and k + 1 ≥ a, b ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 2: Due to (D3), we have
T2[Q1] ≤
1
2k + 1
. (D10)
Hence, Condition (2) and (D7) imply that
β ≥
α− 12k+1
T1[Q0]−
1
2k+1
(D11)
and
T1[Q0] >
1
2k + 1
. (D12)
Due to the relations (D4) and (D6), Lemma 3 guaran-
tees that
Pˆa,b,0(S2k+1 = T2k+1 = 0|Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
≥1−
1
2k + 1
Pˆa,b,0(Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
−1
when a and b satisfy the conditions a+ b ≤ 2k + 1, 0 ≤
a ≤ k + 1, and 0 ≤ b ≤ k + 1. Hence,
Pˆa,b,0(S2k+1 = T2k+1 = Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)
≥Pˆa,b,0(Sj = Tk+j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k)−
1
2k + 1
under the same condition. Taking the expectation for
Q0, we have
T3[Q0] ≥ T1[Q0]−
1
2k + 1
. (D13)
Thus, we have
βT3[Q0]
βT1[Q0] + (1− β)T2[Q1]
(a)
≥
βT3[Q0]
βT1[Q0] +
(1−β)
2k+1
(b)
≥
T3[Q0]
α
α− 12k+1
T1[Q0]−
1
2k+1
=
T3[Q0]
T1[Q0]−
1
2k+1
(1−
1
α(2k + 1)
)
(c)
≥ 1−
1
α(2k + 1)
where (a) and (c) follow from (D10) and the combination
of (D13) and (D12), respectively. The remaining part
(b) follows from (D11) and the fact that βT1[Q0]
βT1[Q0]+
(1−β)
2k+1
=
T1[Q0]
T1[Q0]+
( 1
β
−1)
2k+1
is monotone increasing for β.
Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 3
Define
ξ(a, b, k)
:=(k + 1− a)(k + 1− b)− (k + 1)2 + ab
+
(k + 1)2 · (2k + 1) · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(2k + 1) · (k + 1) · · · (k + 2− a) · (k + 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
=
(k + 1)2 · (2k) · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k + 1) · · · (k + 2− a) · (k + 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
− (a+ b)k + 2ab− (a+ b).
Since (D9) is equivalent with ξ(a, b, k) ≥ 0, we show the
non-negativity of ξ(a, b, k) in this section.
1. Organization
Before proceeding to the detailed analysis, we overview
the organization of this section. We firstly show the non-
negativity of ξ(a, b, k) for the cases with k = 1, 2, 3 in
Subsections E 2, E 3, and E4. In the remaining subsec-
tion, we show it for the cases with k ≥ 4. The detail or-
ganization can be summarized as follows. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that a ≥ b due to the symmetry
of ξ(a, b, k). Remember that the relations k+1 ≥ a, b ≥ 0
and 2k + 1 ≥ a+ b are also assumed.
a. Cases: k = 1, 2, 3
Combining discussions in Subsections E 2, E 3, and
E4, we can cover all of cases with k = 1, 2, 3 due to
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the following reasons. The cases with k = 1 are com-
posed of (a, b) = (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2).
The cases with k = 2 are composed of (a, b) =
(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2), (3, 0), (3, 1), (3, 2).
These cases are covered in Subsection E 2.
The cases with k = 3 are composed of (a, b) =
(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2), (3, 0), (3, 1), (3, 2),
(3, 3), (4, 0), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3). In fact, the case with
(a, b, k) = (3, 3, 3) is covered in Subsection E 4, and the
cases with (a, b, k) = (4, 0, 3), (4, 1, 3), (4, 2, 3), (4, 3, 3)
are covered in Subsection E 3. So, combining the cases
discussed in Subsection E 2, we can show the cases
with k = 3. So, we assume that k ≥ 4 in the following
discussion.
b. Cases: a ≤ 2 and k ≥ 4
The cases with a ≤ 2 are covered in Subsection E 2.
c. Cases: a+ b ≤ 5 and k ≥ 4
Many cases with a + b ≤ 5 are covered in Subsection
E 2. The remaining cases are (a, b) = (4, 0), (4, 1), (5, 0).
The cases (a, b) = (4, 0), (5, 0) are covered in in Subsec-
tions E 5, and the case (a, b) = (4, 1) is covered in in
Subsections E 6.
d. Cases: a+ b ≥ 6, a ≥ 3 and k ≥ 4
The cases with a+b ≥ 6, a ≥ 3 and k ≥ 4 are classified
as Table I. Hence, all cases have been covered.
TABLE I: Cases with a+ b ≥ 6, a ≥ 3 and k ≥ 4
Subsection Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3
E 7
a = b
k+2
2
≥ a -
E 8 k+2
2
< a -
E 9
a ≥ b+ 1
k+2
2
≥ b
b ≥ 2
E 5 b = 0
E 6 b = 1
E10 k+2
2
< b -
2. Case: (a, b) =
(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2), (3, 0), (3, 1), (3, 2)
Since the function ξ(a, b, k) is symmetric for a and b,
we consider only the case when a ≥ b. For specific values
(a, b), ξ(a, b, k) can be calculated as follows.
ξ(0, 0, k) =
(k + 1)2
2k + 1
,
ξ(1, 0, k) = 0,
ξ(1, 1, k) = 0,
ξ(2, 0, k) = 0,
ξ(2, 1, k) = k − 1,
ξ(2, 2, k) = 4
(k − 1)2
k
,
ξ(3, 0, k) =
(k + 1)2
k − 1
,
ξ(3, 1, k) = 4k − 2,
ξ(3, 2, k) =
11k2 − 25k + 12
k
.
The above values are non-negative when k ≥ a, b.
3. Case: a = k + 1
ξ(k + 1, b, k)
=
(2k) · · · (k + 1− b)
k!(k · · · (k + 2− b))
− (k + 1)2 + b(k + 1)
=(k + 1)(
(2k) · · · (k + 1− b)
k!((k + 1) · · · (k + 2− b))
− (k + 1− b))
=(k + 1)(k + 1− b)(
(2k) · · · (k + 2− b)
k!((k + 1) · · · (k + 2− b))
− 1)
=(k + 1)(k + 1− b)(
(2k) · · · (k + 2)
k!
− 1)
=(k + 1)(k + 1− b)(
(k + k)(k + k − 1) · · · (k + 2)
k(k − 1) · 2
− 1)
≥0.
4. Case: (a, b) = (3, 3)
ξ(3, 3, k) can be calculated as follows.
ξ(3, 3, k) =
2(k − 2)
k(k − 1)
(13k2 − 29k + 12). (E1)
The case (a, b) = (3, 3) is possible only when k ≥ 3. It is
positive in this case.
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5. Case: b = 0 and a ≥ 2
Since 2k···(2k+2−a)k···(k+2−a) ≥ 2
a−1, we have
ξ(a, 0, k) =
2k · · · (2k + 2− a) · (k + 1)
k · · · (k + 2− a)
− a(k + 1)
=(k + 1)(
2k · · · (2k + 2− a)
k · · · (k + 2− a)
− a)
≥(k + 1)(2a−1 − a) ≥ 0.
6. Case: b = 1 and a ≥ 3
Since the relations (2k−2)···(2k+1−a)(k−1)···(k+2−a) ≥ 2
a−2 and 2k−1k ≥
1 hold, we have
ξ(a, 1, k)
=2k
2k − 1
k
(2k − 2) · · · (2k + 1− a)
(k − 1) · · · (k + 2− a)
− (a+ 1)k + a− 1
≥2a−1k − (a+ 1)k + a− 1
=(2a−1 − a− 1)k + a− 1
(a)
≥ 0,
where (a) follows from the inequality a ≥ 3, respectively.
7. Case: a = b, a ≥ 3, and k+2
2
≥ a
We have
(2k − 1)(2k − 2) · · · (2k + 5− 2a)(2k + 4− 2a)
((k − 1) · · · (k + 2− a))2
≥22(a−2). (E2)
Since k+22 ≥ a, we have
(2k + 3− 2a)
k
≥
(2k + 2− 2a)
k
≥ 1 (E3)
Thus, the combination of (E2) and (E3) yields that
2k · · · (2k + 2− 2a)
(k · · · (k + 2− a))2
=2k
(2k − 1)(2k − 2) · · · (2k + 5− 2a)(2k + 4− 2a)
((k − 1) · · · (k + 2− a))2
×
(2k + 3− 2a)(2k + 2− 2a)
k2
≥22(a−2)+1k. (E4)
Therefore,
ξ(a, a, k) =
2k · · · (2k + 2− 2a)
(k · · · (k + 2− a))2
− 2ak + 2(a2 − a)
(a)
≥22(a−2)+1k − 2ak + 2(a2 − a)
=(22(a−2)+1 − 2a)k + 2(a2 − a)
(b)
≥ 0,
where (a) and (b) follow from (E4) and the inequality
a ≥ 3, respectively.
8. Case: a = b, k ≥ a > k+2
2
, and k ≥ 4
Firstly, we show
(2k − 1)(2k − 2) · · · k
(k(k − 1) · · · (⌊k2 ⌋+ 1)) · (k(k − 1) · · · (⌈
k
2 ⌉+ 1))
≥2k−2. (E5)
When k is an even number 2s,
(2k − 1)(2k − 2) · · · k
(k(k − 1) · · · (⌊k2⌋+ 1)) · (k(k − 1) · · · (⌈
k
2⌉+ 1))
=
(4s− 1)(4s− 2) · · · (2s)
((s2)(2s− 1) · · · (s+ 1))2
=
(4s− 1)(4s− 3) · · · (2s+ 1)
(2s)(2s− 1) · · · (s+ 1)
(4s− 2)(4s− 4) · · · (2s)
(2s)(2s− 1) · · · (s+ 1)
≥
(4s− 1)(4s− 3) · · · (2s+ 3)
(2s− 1)(2s− 2) · · · (s+ 1)
(4s− 2)(4s− 4) · · · (2s+ 2)
(2s− 1)(2s− 2) · · · (s+ 1)
≥2s−1 · 2s−1 = 22s−2 = 2k−2.
When k is an odd number 2s+ 1,
(2k − 1)(2k − 2) · · · k
(k(k − 1) · · · (⌊k2 ⌋+ 1)) · (k(k − 1) · · · (⌈
k
2⌉+ 1))
=
(4s+ 1)(4s) · · · (2s+ 1)
(((2s+ 1)(2s) · · · (s+ 1) · (2s+ 1)(2s) · · · (s+ 2)))
=
(4s+ 1)(4s− 1) · · · (2s+ 1)
(2s+ 1)(2s) · · · (s+ 1)
(4s)(4s− 2) · · · (2s+ 2)
(2s+ 1)(2s) · · · (s+ 2))
≥
(4s+ 1)(4s− 1) · · · (2s+ 3)
(2s)(2s− 1) · · · (s+ 1)
(4s)(4s− 2) · · · (2s+ 4)
(2s)(2s− 1) · · · (s+ 2))
≥2s · 2s−1 = 22s−1 = 2k−2.
Hence, we obtain (E5).
Considering the even and odd cases in the same way,
we can show that
(k − 1) · · · (2k + 2− 2a)
(⌊k2 ⌋ · · · (k + 2− a)) · (⌈
k
2 ⌉ · · · (k + 2− a))
≥ 1. (E6)
The condition k ≥ a > k+22 implies that a ≥ ⌈
k
2 ⌉ + 1.
Hence, we have
⌊
k
2
⌋+ 1 ≥ k + 2− a. (E7)
Combining (E5), (E6), and (E7), we have
2k · · · (2k + 2− 2a)
(k · · · (k + 2− a))2
=2k
(2k − 1)(2k − 2) · · · (k + 2)(k + 1)k
(k(k − 1) · · · (⌊k2⌋+ 1)) · (k(k − 1) · · · (⌈
k
2 ⌉+ 1))
×
(k − 1) · · · (2k + 2− 2a)
(⌊k2 ⌋ · · · (k + 2− a)) · (⌈
k
2 ⌉ · · · (k + 2− a))
≥2k
(2k − 1)(2k − 2) · · · (k + 2)(k + 1)k
(k(k − 1) · · · (⌊k2⌋+ 1)) · (k(k − 1) · · · (⌈
k
2 ⌉+ 1))
≥2k2k−2. (E8)
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Thus,
ξ(a, a, k) =
2k · · · (2k + 2− 2a)
(k · · · (k + 2− a))2
− 2ak + 2(a2 − a)
(a)
≥ 2k2k−2 − 2ak + 2(a2 − a) = 2(2k−2 − a)k + 2(a2 − a)
(b)
≥2(2k−2 − k)k + 2(a2 − a)
(c)
≥ 0,
where (a), (b), and (c) follow from (E8), the inequality
k ≥ a, and the inequality k ≥ 4, respectively.
9. Case: k+1
2
≥ b ≥ 2 and a ≥ b+ 1 and a+ b ≥ 6
Since the above cases cover all of cases with a+ b ≤ 5,
we can assume that a+ b ≥ 6 in the following discussion
as well as k ≥ 4, b ≥ 2. Since b ≥ 2 and a ≥ b + 1, we
have the following calculation.
2k
(2k − 1)(2k − 3) · · · (2k + 3− 2b)
k(k − 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
(2k − 2)(2k − 4) · · · (2k + 2− 2b)
k(k − 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
(2k + 1− 2b)(2k − 2b) · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k + 1− b)(k − b) · · · (k + 2− a)
=2k
(2k − 1)(2k − 3) · · · (2k + 5− 2b)
(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · (k + 2− b)
(2k + 3− 2b)
k
(2k − 2)(2k − 4) · · · (2k + 4− 2b)
(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · (k + 2− b)
×
(2k + 2− 2b)
k
(2k + 1− 2b)
(k + 1− b)
(2k − 2b) · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k − b) · · · (k + 2− a)
=2k
(2k − 1)(2k − 3) · · · (2k + 5− 2b)
(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · (k + 2− b)
(2k − 2)(2k − 4) · · · (2k + 4− 2b)
(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · (k + 2− b)
(2k + 2− 2b)
k
×
(2k − 2b) · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k − b) · · · (k + 2− a)
(2k + 3− 2b)
k
(2k + 1− 2b)
(k + 1− b)
=2k
(2k − 1)(2k − 3) · · · (2k + 5− 2b)
(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · (k + 2− b)
(2k − 2)(2k − 4) · · · (2k + 4− 2b)
(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · (k + 2− b)
(2k + 2− 2b)
k
×
(2k − 2b) · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k − b) · · · (k + 2− a)
(2k + 1− 2b)
k
(2k + 3− 2b)
(k + 1− b)
(a)
≥ 2k · 2b−2 · 2b−2 · 2(a−b−1) · 2 = 2a+b−3k, (E9)
where (a) follows the following relations. We have
(2k−1)(2k−3)···(2k+5−2b)
(k−1)(k−2)···(k+2−b) ≥ 2
b−2, (2k−2)(2k−4)···(2k+4−2b)(k−1)(k−2)···(k+2−b) =
2b−2, (2k+2−2b)k ≥ 1,
(2k+1−2b)
k ≥ 1, and
(2k+3−2b)
(k+1−b) ≥ 2.
Also, the assumption guarantees the relation a ≥ 2,
which implies that (2k−2b)···(2k+2−a−b)(k−b)···(k+2−a) ≥ 2
(a−b−1).
Hence,
ξ(a, b, k) =
2k · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k · · · (k + 2− a)) · (k · · · (k + 2− b))
− (a+ b)k + (2ab− a− b)
=
2k · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k · · · (k + 2− a)) · (k · · · (k + 2− b))
− (a+ b)k + (2ab− a− b)
(b)
≥(2a+b−3 − (a+ b))k + (2ab− a− b)
(c)
≥ 0.
where (b) and (c) follow from (E9) and the inequality
a+ b ≥ 6, respectively.
10. Case: b > k+1
2
, k ≥ a ≥ b+ 1, and k ≥ 4
The condition b > k2+1 implies b ≥ k+1−⌊
k
2⌋. Hence,
we have ⌊k2 ⌋+ 1 ≥ (k + 2− b). Thus, we have
(2k − 1)(2k − 3) · · · (2k + 3− 2b)
k(k − 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
≥
(2k − 1)(2k − 3) · · · (2⌊k2 ⌋+ 1)
k(k − 1) · · · (⌊k2 ⌋+ 1)
=
(2k − 1)(2k − 3) · · · (2⌊k2 ⌋+ 2)
(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · (⌊k2 ⌋+ 1)
(2⌊k2⌋+ 1)
k
≥ 2k−⌊
k
2 ⌋−1.
Since b ≥ k+1− ⌈k2⌉ implies (⌈
k
2 ⌉+1) ≥ (k+2− b), we
have
(2k − 2)(2k − 4) · · · (2k + 2− 2b)
k(k − 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
≥
(2k − 2)(2k − 4) · · · (2⌈k2 ⌉)
k(k − 1) · · · (⌈k2⌉+ 1)
=
(2k − 2)(2k − 4) · · · (2⌈k2 ⌉+ 2)
(k − 1)(k − 2) · · · (⌈k2 ⌉+ 1)
(2⌈k2⌉)
k
≥ 2k−⌈
k
2 ⌉−1.
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Hence,
2k · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k · · · (k + 2− a)) · (k · · · (k + 2− b))
=2k
(2k − 1)(2k − 3) · · · (2k + 3− 2b)
k(k − 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
×
(2k − 2)(2k − 4) · · · (2k + 2− 2b)
k(k − 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
×
(2k + 1− 2b)(2k − 2b) · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k + 1− b)(k − b) · · · (k + 2− a)
≥2k
(2k − 1)(2k − 3) · · · (2k + 3− 2b)
k(k − 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
×
(2k − 2)(2k − 4) · · · (2k + 2− 2b)
k(k − 1) · · · (k + 2− b)
≥2k · 2k−⌊
k
2 ⌋−1 · 2k−⌈
k
2 ⌉−1
=22k−⌊
k
2 ⌋−⌈ k2 ⌉−1k = 2k−1k. (E10)
Thus, we have
ξ(a, b, k)
=
2k · · · (2k + 2− a− b)
(k · · · (k + 2− a)) · (k · · · (k + 2− b))
− (a+ b)k + (2ab− a− b)
(a)
≥2k−1k − (a+ b)k + (2ab− a− b)
=(2k−1 − (a+ b))k + (2ab− a− b)
(b)
≥(2k−1 − 2k + 1)k + (2ab− a− b)
(c)
≥ 0,
where (a), (b), and (c) follow from (E10), the inequality
a+ b ≤ 2k − 1, and the inequality k ≥ 4, respectively.
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